

BARRY M. GOLDWATER, “1964 REPUBLICAN NOMINATION ACCEPTANCE SPEECH,” SAN FRANCISCO, CA (16 JULY 1964)

Carl R. Burghardt
Colorado State University

Abstract: On July 16, 1964, Barry M. Goldwater delivered a speech to the Republican National Convention that shocked most of the country. In accepting the nomination for president, Goldwater appeared to endorse extreme measures, and he alienated moderate members of his own party. Goldwater lost the 1964 election to Lyndon Johnson in a landslide. Although Goldwater’s “Acceptance Speech” was not well designed to win a presidential election, it was better suited to summoning participation in a countercultural movement that rejected the progressive agenda of the 1960s. Employing a social movement perspective, this essay will identify and analyze the rhetorical mechanisms that may have helped Goldwater coalesce an enduring conservative audience, including techniques of moral division and association, robust language to construct an appealing identity, and redefinition of political labels.

Keywords: “Goldwaterism,” Conservative, Countercultural, Identity, Extremism, Social Movement, Constitute, Ego Function

Senator Barry M. Goldwater’s 1964 “Acceptance Speech” is considered one of the biggest political disasters in U.S. history. As I hope to demonstrate, however, the dominant goal of Goldwater’s address was not maximizing the number of votes in a particular presidential election. Rather, it was crystallizing an ideological worldview and summoning participation in a countercultural movement that rejected the progressive agenda of the 1960s. Employing a social movement perspective, I will attempt to account for the rhetorical decisions Goldwater made during his “Acceptance Speech” that, on the surface, appeared to be irrational or counterproductive. I will identify and analyze the rhetorical mechanisms that may have helped Goldwater coalesce an enduring conservative audience. Specifically, I will focus on techniques of moral division and association, robust language to construct an appealing identity, and redefinition of political labels.

Goldwater delivered his “Acceptance Speech” on July 16, 1964, to the Republican National Convention in San Francisco. Near the end of the speech, he proclaimed defiantly, “I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue” (51-52).¹ These words are among the most controversial ever uttered at a mainstream political convention in the United States. Although Goldwater’s loyal followers roared their approval, more moderate Republicans were dismayed, and the senator’s Democratic opponents fully exploited the inflammatory nature of these words. The “extremism” passage triggered a vehement reaction that largely eclipsed many other aspects of Goldwater’s complex oration. Indeed, in the decades following the 1964 Republican National convention, the dominant historical judgment was that Goldwater delivered a defective speech that doomed his campaign to failure. In this view, if he had presented a less radical address, the electoral outcome might have been closer. Such a narrative suggests that the “extremism” statement was a colossal mistake that invalidated the entire oration.

Carl R. Burghardt, Carl.Burghardt@ColoState.edu

Last Updated: Summer 2024

Voices of Democracy, ISSN #1932-9539. Available at <http://www.voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/>.

In 1964 most commentators realized immediately that the senator's address did not perform several of the most important tasks of an acceptance speech at a major political convention. According to Lee Edwards, "Normally, an acceptance speech is an instrument for reaching out, for binding up wounds, for bringing together."² However, as Robert D. Novak observed, "For the first time in memory at a contested convention, the victor had no words of kindness or of praise for the vanquished." Goldwater's famous statement about extremism "shattered the last flickering hope that party unity would come out of San Francisco."³ John C. Hammerback noted that Goldwater's divisive discourse "alienated not only Democrats but Republican moderates who had earlier attempted unsuccessfully to alter the convention platform to denounce extremist groups."⁴

It seemed obvious to the majority of political observers that Goldwater's "Acceptance Speech" portended defeat at the polls. Numerous commentators went further and predicted the destruction of the Republican Party, or even the end of conservative ideology in the United States. For example, James Reston of the *New York Times* said "Barry Goldwater not only lost the Presidential election yesterday but the conservative cause as well. He has wrecked his party for a long time to come and is not even likely to control the wreckage."⁵ *The New Yorker's* Richard Rovere concluded, "The election has finished the Goldwater school of political reaction."⁶

Writing in 1964, communication scholar George W. Dell was more prescient. Despite Goldwater's crushing defeat, Dell predicted "we are probably destined to hear the echoes of Goldwaterism for years to come in our political dialogue."⁷ In 1993 Kathryn M. Olson argued that Goldwater was "an important figure in broadening the spectrum of contemporary political discourse." Although Goldwater lost the presidential election, according to Olson, "his candidacy and rhetoric moved the boundary or anchor point of present-day political rhetoric to the right."⁸ More specifically, Hammerback labeled Goldwater's 1964 discourse as "reconstitutive rhetoric" and claimed that the senator "demonstrated how to build and animate an audience which would zealously support solidly conservative candidates and ideology." Hammerback explained that Goldwater's rhetoric focused on identity and aimed to "reformulate his audience."⁹ To borrow the words of Louis Althusser, by constructing an appealing identity, Goldwater's speech "hailed" a nascent conservative community and helped to "constitute" an enduring social and ideological movement.¹⁰ In short, concluded Hammerback, Goldwater "not only asked audiences to think some way or do something, he asked them to be somebody."¹¹

Goldwater's Early Life and Political Career

Barry Morris Goldwater was born on January 1, 1909, in Phoenix, Arizona. His parents were owners of Goldwater's, a successful department store. Young Barry did not do well in high school, so he transferred to Staunton Military Academy in 1928, where he flourished. Subsequently, Goldwater attended the University of Arizona, but dropped out after one year. He joined Goldwater's Department Store and became president in 1937. During World War II, Goldwater volunteered for the Army Air Corp but was turned away because of his age (twenty-eight), weak eyesight, and knee injuries. With the assistance of both Arizona United States Senators, he was accepted into the Army infantry and in time became a pilot for the Army Air Corp, ferrying fighter planes to Europe and Asia. In 1945, he left active service in the military with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.¹²

In 1949 Goldwater entered politics by running for the Phoenix City Council on a non-partisan basis, and he was easily elected. The next year, he successfully managed the campaign of Howard Pyle, Republican candidate for governor. Goldwater ran for U.S. Senator in 1952, characterizing himself as conservative, “not a me-too Republican.” He “rode the coattails” of well-liked Republican presidential candidate of Dwight Eisenhower and was elected. In 1958, Goldwater was reelected to the Senate, in a year when few conservatives prospered. This success put him in the national spotlight, and Goldwater developed a strong reputation as a campaigner and party fundraiser.¹³

Rhetoric was vital to Barry Goldwater’s success as a local politician, U.S. Senator, and Republican nominee for president. In January of 1960 Goldwater debuted a syndicated newspaper column in the *Los Angeles Times*, “How Do You Stand, Sir?”¹⁴ Three years later, two hundred newspapers carried his editorials that reinforced and popularized the concepts he would include in his bestselling political tract, *The Conscience of a Conservative* (1960), which was crafted out of Goldwater’s old speeches and edited by Brent Bozell.¹⁵ The combination of the book and the newspaper column created demand for Goldwater’s speeches and requests for interviews from prominent print journalists.¹⁶ From 1959 to 1963 Goldwater delivered an average of two hundred speeches annually.¹⁷

As a Senator, Goldwater consistently opposed federal spending on social welfare and urban renewal programs. He also wanted to limit spending on Social Security, fearing that expanding benefits would bankrupt the system. Concerning another issue, Goldwater insisted he was personally opposed to racial discrimination, but he voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that the act violated states’ rights. He was a staunch anti-Communist, advocating “Peace through strength” and expressed willingness to use “appropriate nuclear weapons” in certain situations. He opposed arms control negotiations and was against a nuclear test ban treaty. Finally, Goldwater often criticized foreign economic and military aid because it was wasteful and extravagant.¹⁸

Barry Goldwater and the 1964 Presidential Campaign

From Goldwater’s formal announcement of his candidacy on January 3, 1964, to his victory in the crucially important California primary election, the senator from Arizona conducted a public speaking campaign full of gaffes and controversial, if not radical, policy pronouncements.¹⁹ Fortunately for Goldwater, however, the decisive campaign for winning the support of convention delegates was conducted behind the scenes. While the Republican primary campaigns unfolded on the national stage, a more successful and efficient operation had been quietly locking up the nomination for Barry Goldwater.²⁰

On June 2, 1964, Goldwater won the expensive and divisive Republican primary in California.²¹ By June 7, Goldwater had augmented this electoral triumph with state caucus or convention wins in Alabama, Colorado, Washington, Hawaii, and Virginia. Texas and Arkansas followed on June 16.²² In retrospect, there were only three disputed primaries for the Republicans: New Hampshire, Oregon, and California. The voters selected Henry Cabot Lodge in New Hampshire, Nelson Rockefeller in Oregon, and Goldwater in California.²³ On the other hand, “Goldwater won all but two of the primaries he entered and piled up 2,150,000 votes—more votes than all of the other candidates combined.”²⁴ In the end, Goldwater easily prevailed in San Francisco with 883 delegates.²⁵

Even though Goldwater's nomination was virtually assured by June, Richard Nixon, George Romney, and William Scranton mounted serious efforts to derail his candidacy. At a governor's conference Romney stated he would challenge Goldwater for the nomination if "his views deviate . . . from the heritage of our party."²⁶ Nixon encouraged Romney to run, stating, "it would be a tragedy if Senator Goldwater's views as previously stated were not challenged—and repudiated."²⁷ On June 12, in Baltimore, Governor Scranton of Pennsylvania declared he was a candidate for the Republican nomination, explaining that he could not allow "an exclusion-minded minority [to] dominate our platform and choose our candidates."²⁸

Because Goldwater had decisively captured the Republican nomination, he bitterly resented the efforts of liberal Republicans to disrupt his campaign. Goldwater characterized the aggressive rebukes of his conservative positions as "the most savage attack that I had witnessed in my political career. . . . I was deeply hurt by the accusations of fellow Republicans, especially the harshness of their language."²⁹ Goldwater conceded in his autobiography, "There was antagonism on our side, no question about it. If the old party leadership had tried to exclude the conservatives from power, the 'true believers' on the right were not ready to make peace with the liberals. . . . Republicans had alienated one another in the struggle for the party's soul."³⁰ Conservatives felt that the liberals were willing to destroy any chance of winning the 1964 election to prevent Goldwater and his allies from taking control of the party.

Goldwater and the Rhetoric of Social Movements

Although Goldwater's famous acceptance speech seems to be full of self-defeating strategies, I maintain that his rhetorical decisions become more intelligible if understood as part of a conservative social movement that can best be described as counterrevolutionary or countercultural—a view that was held by some journalists of the day, as well as political participants. For example, James Reston, writing for the *New York Times* of June 29, 1964, identified Goldwater's appeals as a "counter-revolution against the trend of social, economic, and foreign policies of the last generation."³¹ Edwards agreed, adding that Goldwater wanted to "reverse the trend toward the welfare state at home and to undertake an aggressive policy of victory over communism abroad." "Goldwater was a counterrevolutionary," maintained Edwards, "who challenged the statist revolution of the New Deal-Fair Deal-New Frontier."³²

Goldwater's discourse, as exemplified by his 1964 "Acceptance Speech," fits the profile for social movement rhetoric outlined by communication scholars. Charles J. Stewart, et al., explained that "A social movement promotes or opposes a program for change in societal norms and values. Its rhetoric includes prescriptions for what must be done, who must do it, and how it must be done." More specifically, Goldwater's campaign matched the definition of a "revivalistic social movement," which, according to Stewart, et al., "seeks to replace existing norms and values with ones from a *venerable, idealized past*."³³ Hammerback and Jensen drew a similar conclusion: Goldwater's devoted followers "strove to restore an earlier America." Overall, Goldwater wanted to turn back the clock and reestablish cultural values and policies from the past.³⁴

While Goldwater's strategy was poorly adapted to attracting moderate voters and winning national elections, it made sense for constructing a durable, countercultural, social movement. Typical of many social movement leaders, Goldwater did not reject the more radical elements of his supporters, and these right-wing organizations endorsed Goldwater enthusiastically. For example, the leader of the Minutemen stated that his organization was

“close to being 100% for Goldwater,” and Robert Welch of the John Birch Society strongly supported the senator from Arizona.³⁵ According to Julius Duscha, Goldwater did not agree with the radical views of some of his supporters. Nonetheless, “he does nothing to repudiate them or their extremist views—and he makes no move to disenchant them in their belief that he is their spokesman and savior.” Indeed, Duscha maintained that Goldwater’s “zealous supporters” from California regarded him “as a messiah come to lead them out of a wilderness made untenable by . . . Communist conspiracies and the strangling interference of the Federal government.”³⁶ Goldwater made a calculated political and rhetorical decision not to repudiate the radical members of the conservative movement.³⁷ Indeed, Ernest Wraga summarized the Republican nominee’s dilemma precisely: “Goldwater’s problem then is to retain their support while escaping the opprobrium that attaches to them.”³⁸

According to Herbert W. Simons, a social movement “leader wins and maintains adherents by saying to them what they cannot say to others or even to themselves. A major rhetorical process, then, consists of legitimizing privately held feelings by providing social support and rationalizations for those feelings.”³⁹ Goldwater’s rhetoric was seductive for many because he stated what his followers did not dare to say publicly. Supporting Goldwater was a way of hitting back or sending a message to elites who openly disrespected or disregarded them. Richard D. Gregg argued that a central purpose of social movement rhetoric was to serve an “ego function” in which social movement leaders “become surrogates for others who share their intimate feelings of inadequacy.” In this situation, the rhetoric is “self-directed,” rather than “other-directed.” In addition, Gregg almost seemed to be speaking directly about Goldwater’s “Acceptance Speech”: “By identifying against an other, one may delineate his own position—locate himself by contrast. By painting the enemy in dark hued imagery of vice, corruption, evil, and weakness, one may more easily convince himself of his own superior virtue and thereby gain a symbolic victory of ego-enhancement.”⁴⁰ Goldwater attacked Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic Party, Communism, and liberal ideology in general. In Gregg’s words, “The rhetoric of attack becomes at the same time a rhetoric of ego-building, and the very act of assuming such a rhetorical stance becomes self-persuasive and confirmatory.”⁴¹

Goldwater appealed to individuals who were alienated by the societal transformations of the early 1960s. Novak claimed that Goldwater supporters belonged to a “part of America that was tired of the welfare state, of high taxes, of big government, of Communist successes abroad, and—most of all, or so it seemed—of the East Coast.”⁴² Duscha maintained that Goldwater won the crucial California primary because his voters “turned out in triumphant numbers to vote for the man who expressed their bitterness and anxieties.”⁴³ The power of Goldwater’s rhetoric to help transform the Republican Party and popularize conservative ideology nationally can be explained, at least in part, by the ways in which his discourse recognized these disrespected individuals, bolstered their self-esteem, coalesced them into a community with a sense of belonging, and, ultimately, provided them with an appealing and unifying identity. Following Gregg’s concept, Goldwater’s discourse symbolically restored a sense of agency to his conservative followers. He directed his rhetoric towards the self-esteem, identity, and emotional well-being of frustrated traditional or conservative citizens.⁴⁴

Textual Analysis

Goldwater’s speech operated rhetorically on two levels: as a conventional acceptance speech and as social movement discourse. Despite the largely negative, public, immediate

reaction, the speech conformed to many aspects of the presidential acceptance speech genre. Drawing from a list of criteria provided by Theodore Sheckels, I maintain that Goldwater performed at least six major functions of this genre. First, Goldwater met the technical purpose of an acceptance speech, which was to formally accept the nomination. Second, Goldwater presented philosophies or policies that would govern his “future administration.” Third, the speech had a coherent, unifying theme, with clear philosophical tenets, moral values, and expectations for behavior. Fourth, Goldwater consistently referred to the past, bolstering his positions with familiar historical analogies and patriotic sentiments. Fifth, he employed inclusive, figurative language and maintained that the pending election would be crucially important to the future of the United States. Finally, setting aside his “extremism” statement, Goldwater did, in fact, offer several conciliatory statements, including the promise of unity. He asked for help from other Republicans, and he pledged his total dedication to the campaign.⁴⁵

Interwoven with the conventional speech, however, was a partly concealed discourse that attempted to crystallize a conservative, countercultural movement. In short, the *form* of the speech resembled a standard acceptance speech, while the *function* of the oration reflected a different rhetorical purpose. The “surface,” conventional layer contrasted Republicans and Democrats because of differences in policies and national priorities, while the partially “submerged,” interwoven narrative separated Goldwater’s followers from his opponents based on identity. The “extremism” passage is only the most striking example of social movement rhetoric that largely negated the numerous gestures that the speech made towards reasonableness and conciliation. The two layers of the speech frequently were at cross-purposes and resulted in an intricate structure that is often difficult to parse. More can be said about the ways in which Goldwater’s speech conformed to the presidential acceptance speech genre. For the purposes of this essay, however, I will analyze the rhetorical inducements that sought to inspire a conservative political community.

Dividing Liberals and Conservatives

After the obligatory, introductory passages, Goldwater began to divide his listeners based on identity. For the rest of the speech, he would split Republicans from Democrats and, by implication, liberal Republicans from conservative Republicans. Devotees of Goldwaterism, he claimed, were a special kind of people with distinctive characters, attributes, and credentials. For example, those who aspired to preach the Goldwater gospel must “renew freedom’s vision in our own hearts and in our own homes” (7). Such a requisite was akin to the Christian notion of being “born again.” Dedication to conservatism needed to be “renewed,” meaning that followers of the movement must rediscover a truth they once held dear but perhaps had begun to forget or doubt.

In Goldwater’s mind, good character brought about good policies and outcomes. The benefits of his political program could be realized only if the character of its contributors justified it. Those who shared the goals of Goldwaterism must display “dedication” (7), be willing to take “risk” (9, 33), expend great “effort” (33), and be prepared for “sacrifice” (33). In other words, virtuous character would lead to a glorious future. Specifically, Goldwater exhorted his devotees to become “freedom’s missionaries in a doubting world” (7). His followers must carry a redemptive message to those who lacked faith in conservative doctrine. They needed to adopt the identity of a believer, a person who had the devotion, energy, and conviction to change the world for the better. Such a political personality reflected the certitude and evangelistic fervor of the conservative movement and the mission of the United States in general: a duty to serve as a “model,” to spread the American way of life around the globe (7).

Approximately one-third of the way into his “Acceptance Speech,” Goldwater made it clear that conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats were divided by more than mere policy differences. Indeed, Goldwater argued that his followers were fundamentally unlike his ideological opponents. They were not just groups that disagreed on what action to take in the future but were essentially dissimilar on matters of values, character, theology, worldview, and perception of reality. Goldwater believed that LBJ and the Democrats had “a fundamentally and absolutely wrong view of man, his nature, and his destiny” (17). Such profound differences were not subject to compromise or change through political discourse. In short, this was not a contest between opponents with credible ideas and characters. Only Goldwater’s positions were reputable.

Goldwater declared that President Johnson’s administration eschewed moral leadership and strove for selfish purposes. Members of the Democratic administration were “Small men, seeking great wealth or power” (12). For “too long,” they have “turned even the highest levels of public service into mere personal opportunity” (12). According to Goldwater, Republicans did not excuse Democratic ambitions as “mere political differences or mere political mistakes” (17). Goldwater accused Johnson and his party of prizing material gain over divinely ordained national freedom: “Those who seek to live your lives for you, . . . those who elevate the state and downgrade the citizen, must see ultimately a world in which earthly power can be substituted for divine will. And this nation was founded upon the rejection of that notion and upon the acceptance of God as the author of freedom” (18).

Employing unconditional terms, Goldwater accused his political opponents of pursuing “absolute power” (19). In Goldwater’s mind, “those who seek absolute power” (the Democrats) were “simply demanding the right to enforce their own version of heaven on earth” (19). The Democrats’ notion of paradise would favor centralized government over individual freedom. Furthermore, proclaimed Goldwater, throughout history, those who wanted to control the lives of others “always create the most hellish tyrannies (19). Goldwater insisted that “Absolute power does corrupt, and those who seek it must be suspect and must be opposed” (20).

One of the ways Goldwater divided his political movement from liberal antagonists was through the verbs he associated with each group. Through these terms, Goldwater contrasted conservative and liberal personalities. In Goldwater’s mind, the political battle was between power-hungry totalitarians and defenders of individual liberty. Democrats, Goldwater claimed, “enforce . . . conformity” and “inflict . . . despotism” (21; also occurring in 19). The verbs “enforce” and “inflict” had negative connotations, implying that Democrats (and all liberals) wished to mandate “despotism,” which resonated with the ways in which Goldwater described Communism and the Soviets. Moreover, according to Goldwater, to achieve their national goal of “conformity,” Democrats strove to reduce all citizens to the lowest common denominator. On the other hand, the desire to liberate individuals motivated Republicans. Goldwater summarized the primary task for his conservative adherents: “Our Republican cause is not to level out the world or make its people conform in computer-regimented sameness. Our Republican cause is to free our people and light the way for liberty throughout the world” (51).

Goldwater explained that his movement did not “seek” to mandate, regulate, or control what citizens could do or think: “We don’t seek to live anyone’s life for him. We only seek . . . to secure his rights, guarantee him opportunity to strive” (45). Goldwater repeated the term “seek” a total of eleven times in the speech (3, 18, 19 [twice] 20, 40, 45 [three times] 46 [twice]). “Seek” and the other verb choices strengthened the concept that Republicans stood for choosing among alternatives. His movement “attends” to problems (46) and is devoted to “maintaining”

(46) and “encouraging” freedom of choice (46; “encouraged,” 39 [twice]). Its purpose is to clarify and “define” (46). These verbs created the impression that Republicans valued the voluntary: we seek, not demand; we encourage, not mandate; we define, not order. Moreover, taken together, these verbs suggested a kind of personality, or political identity, rather than a policy prescription. They implied a teaching, counseling, or coaching role. Goldwater’s administration would guide, draw out, and liberate, but not dictate, require, or force. Such a rhetorical posture reverberated naturally with the main theme of freedom.

Goldwater used positive, constructive verbs to portray himself as an effective, inspiring, and prudent leader. This was doubtless an attempt to counteract widely shared public perceptions that he was a rash candidate who proposed risky policies. Goldwater employed the following affirming verbs to introduce a series of sentences or paragraphs: “I believe” (39 [twice]); “I can see” (33, 34, 35, 36, 38); “I know” (38 [four times]); “I pledge” (39); “I envision” (39); “[America] will extend its hand” (39); “I seek” (3, 40); “I cherish” (42). These verbs reinforced the character traits that he had developed consistently throughout the speech: Goldwater was a believer, not a doubter; he was positive and forward-looking. He was a man of vision and could see into the future. He had knowledge and conviction. He kept his promises. He was welcoming rather than defensive, the sort of man who extended the hand of friendship. By contrast, the character of the Democratic leader was not admirable. President Johnson irresponsibly planned a decline of U.S. influence: he “weakly stumbled into conflict” (27); he timidly refused “to draw our own lines against [Communist] aggression” (27); he lied about Vietnam, and he cravenly allowed brave soldiers to die without a clear national purpose (27). In short, the Democrats, as led by Johnson, were unsteady, passive, directionless, and cowardly.

As Goldwater contrasted the identity of conservatives with that of his liberal rivals, he divided the two groups according to their moral traits. Goldwater maintained that Republicans demanded rectitude in government and insisted that public servants tell the truth. Unlike the Democrats, Republicans expected “simple honesty” from everyone regardless of how high their position might be (13). “Honesty” was an admirable virtue that Goldwater advocated, performed, and embodied throughout his rhetoric. On the issue of Vietnam, for example, Goldwater contrasted his own honesty and bluntness with the Democrats, who were duplicitous. In addition to questioning the veracity of President Johnson, Goldwater challenged the candor of the Democratic Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who “continues to mislead and misinform the American people.” (28). “Make no bones of this,” decried Goldwater, “Don’t try to sweep this under the rug. We are at war in Vietnam” (28). Despite this fact, the President “refuses to say, mind you—whether or not the objective over there is victory” (28). Goldwater’s preoccupation with honesty in this speech anticipated the notorious “credibility gap” caused by the Vietnam War, and his critique was later echoed and intensified by opponents of the conflict in Asia.

According to Goldwater, President Johnson’s method was to replace the genuine and valuable with the fake and worthless. This political swindle was profoundly dishonest. “Rather than useful jobs,” for example, Goldwater claimed that LBJ offered bureaucratic “make-work; rather than moral leadership, they have been given bread and circuses” (11). Goldwater compared Democrats to the Roman emperors who distracted the peasants with games while they were being tyrannized. Under Democrats, the people “have been given spectacles, and, yes, they’ve even been given scandals” (11). These distractions concealed the real problems in society and stood in opposition to the forthright, honest manner of Goldwaterites.

Goldwater divided the true believers of the conservative movement from Democrats and liberal Republicans. In effect, he expelled the political “other” by rigorously defining the crucial

issues upon which all Republicans agreed and then excluding those who did not share those beliefs. This ideological “litmus test” measured character, personality, and human essence, rather than mere political opinions. As Goldwater explained, the “Republican Party is a party for free men. Not for blind followers and not for conformists” (48). By contrast, he implied, those who embraced mainstream (liberal), cultural values were subservient sheep who were not welcome in the new Republican Party. By the end of the speech, Goldwater had systematically differentiated his conservative devotees from liberals of both political parties. Goldwater’s adherents were members of a clearly defined group that required internal conversion, discipline, and commitment to conservative ideals. He then excluded from the movement those who did not share the central concern of freedom: “Anyone who joins us in all sincerity, we welcome. Those who do not care for our cause, we don’t expect to enter our ranks in any case” (50).

In effect, Goldwater announced an exclusionary list of membership requirements. First, Goldwaterites must come to the campaign with “sincerity” (50). It was not enough to identify as a generic Republican. Furthermore, proponents must “care for our cause” (50). Others need not apply. Such a statement revealed some of Goldwater’s underlying motives. He wanted to avoid diluting the passion and focus of the cause. Including the less committed would be a type of ideological cooptation, fostered through compromise and ambiguity, which would inevitably subvert Goldwaterism.

Association

As I have discussed, division was a major mode of rhetorical action in Goldwater’s speech. However, he also used its opposite rhetorical maneuver, association, which strove to establish that two separate entities were closely allied. Throughout the speech, Goldwater associated the Democratic Party with the Soviet Communists. In Goldwater’s mind, both were materialistic; both were opposed to valued American ways of life; both were godless; both lacked upstanding character; both opposed freedom and individual initiative; both wanted to control and regulate; both stifled individualism. In short, the Soviets stood for radical egalitarianism, collectivism, and authoritarianism, and so did the Democrats (7, 10, 11, 18, 19, 21, 22, 30, 54). As Goldwater implied, Democrats were the American counterparts of Communists in the Soviet Union. In Goldwater’s vocabulary, those who shared such views were “suspect,” a word that connoted disloyalty and implied hidden Communist sympathies (20). Consistent with Goldwater’s polarized view of the world, association was a means of eliminating the middle ground. Along with division, it erased subtle gradations and created a political context in which compromise was difficult, if not impossible.

Redefining “Extremism”

In the most dramatic moment of the address, Goldwater proclaimed: “I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice” (51). He continued: “And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue” (52). This volcanic declaration came near the end of the oration. I maintain that the extremism passage is not a rhetorical aberration that was “tacked on” to an otherwise aggressive but unremarkable acceptance speech. On the contrary, the address had been building to this moment, like a spring that gradually tightens and then releases suddenly. All the careful division and association uncoil in this startling rhetorical moment in which Goldwater tried to purify, rather than unify, the Republican Party.

In reality, the extremism passage accomplished a number of persuasive functions simultaneously. For one thing, it served as the climax for the partly concealed layer of the speech

that attempted to build group identity and strengthen social cohesion for the conservative movement. For another, Goldwater's utterance provided an opportunity for him to personally "perform" his commitment to conservative ideology. Furthermore, those fateful thirty words affirmed, reassured, and congratulated Goldwater's enthusiastic followers. At the same time, this passage was an insult and repudiation for those who vehemently disagreed with the conservative turn of the Republican Party under Goldwater.

Goldwater and his adherents now experienced the satisfaction of striking back against what he regarded as unethical, unjust attacks against him. This was a moment of ego gratification for him personally, as well as for his followers, who had been reviled by the media and liberal opponents. While the idea of "extremism" repulsed many Americans, Goldwater's most loyal supporters embraced the term. According to Edwards, "For Rockefeller and the liberals, it was a scarlet word to be sewn on the breast of every conservative in the Republican party. For Goldwater and the conservatives, it was a badge of honor to be worn proudly, especially since to do so enraged the liberals."⁴⁶ Because his political enemies and much of the general public had developed suspicions about Goldwater's radicalism, this passage confirmed their worst doubts. However, as a means of celebrating the identities of his conservative adherents, it functioned powerfully to create a sense of elation and victory under circumstances that made it highly unlikely that Goldwater could actually win the presidential election. For members of the Goldwater movement, the extremism passage was a triumphant moment that accelerated the constitution of a conservative community that would work tirelessly against the liberal cultural tide of the 1960s.

Significantly, Goldwater's speechwriters cast the extremism passage in the form of antithesis, a pairing of opposites. Such a stylistic device is a natural fit for an oration that spent so much time comparing and contrasting. Antithesis functions well to make distinctions clear: "We should do this, not that." In using antithesis, Goldwater tried to perform an act of definitional "jujitsu" by turning the tables on the aggressive attacks of his opponents. He attempted, syntactically, to rob "extremism" of its negative connotations and to place it in a political context that made the word seem prudent rather than radical. As such, he sought to reverse the conventional meaning and undertones of the political naming. In doing so, Goldwater followed a rhetorical path used by other social movements. For example, over a period of decades, the LGBTQ+ movement metamorphosed the meaning of the term "queer" from a slur into a virtue.

Ironically, the "extremism" statement did not refer to anything Goldwater stated in the speech itself. It merely alluded to previous utterances on the use of nuclear weapons, altering the Social Security system, and his opposition to national civil rights legislation. Goldwater had made these off-the-cuff remarks at press conferences, interviews, or in senatorial discourse. Unmoored from its highly charged, political context, this notorious passage is not especially "extreme." However, the word "extremism" triggered a whole set of negative associations, and it was a shorthand way of defying followers of Rockefeller and Scranton. The passage declared implicitly that the Republican Party would now represent more conservative policies and values.

Goldwater's speechwriters later admitted that they were surprised by the vehement reaction to the extremism line.⁴⁷ Goldwater conceded, "Frankly, I never expected our critics and the media would focus on the now famous phrase."⁴⁸ At the time, Goldwater reasoned that advocating the utmost effort to promote freedom and justice was in the same spirit that John F. Kennedy proposed in his inaugural declaration: "we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success

of liberty.”⁴⁹ Well after the fact, Goldwater claimed there was no “sinister meaning to the word ‘extremism.’” He continued, “All of us were merely saying there was nothing wrong in being strong in the defense of freedom and no particular good in being weak toward justice.” Goldwater claimed he had intended to emphasize another key term: “If any single word has expressed my political philosophy since entering public life—and to this day—it is ‘freedom.’ I wanted freedom to be the theme of the speech and our entire campaign.”⁵⁰

Reactions to Goldwater’s “Acceptance Speech”

When Goldwater presented his “Acceptance Speech” at San Francisco’s Cow Palace, observers characterized his delivery as sincere, plain, “understated,” and conversational, without many gestures.⁵¹ Tom Wicker maintained that “the mild mannered Senator with his horn-rimmed glasses and his homely way of speaking creates the impression of a simple, honest, natural man of principle who may make mistakes but who always says what he thinks and stands up for what he believes.”⁵² White described Goldwater’s manner of speaking as the “dry voice of the Southwest” that conveyed “a sense of hard virility and barely controlled tension.”⁵³ The *Washington Post* opined that Goldwater “delivered with great power, force and effect, many of the short, balanced sentences which are the trade-mark of his platform technique.”⁵⁴

Like most acceptance speeches, the crowd thundered its approval for nearly every sentence or paragraph.⁵⁵ At the precise moment before Goldwater was poised to deliver his “extremism” line, his organization distributed copies of the speech to the press.⁵⁶ Goldwater then electrified his supporters with the statement, “*I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty—is—no—vice!*” In the words of Perlstein, “This was double-underlined both for his reading copy and the ones for the press. There was no mistaking the statement. It was a deliberate act of political provocation. He had to wait 41 seconds before he could continue.”⁵⁷ Then, Goldwater resumed: “moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!” “The roar from the galleries” was so loud that it “could be heard” in Goldwater’s campaign control room, which was housed in a trailer outside the convention center.⁵⁸

Goldwater’s defiant declaration unleashed a rapturous standing ovation from most of the audience. At the same time, “frenzied delegates,” expressing their contempt for the news media, started to shake the “struts holding up ABC’s broadcast booth.” For over five minutes, Howard K. Smith reportedly feared for his safety.⁵⁹ Columnist James Reston described Goldwater’s extremism statement as “almost an incitement to disorder.”⁶⁰ According to Edwards, Goldwater’s fervent supporters rejoiced “in the stinging rebuff of Rockefeller, Scranton, Romney, and all the others who had taunted and reviled them for so long.”⁶¹ Trent Lott, a recent college graduate, recalled that the lines were “an inspiration [,] . . . a bugle call to arms.” Richard Viguerie, sitting in the gallery, stated that he “‘loved’ the extremism line” and cheered passionately.⁶²

Not all Republicans at the convention approved of the senator’s combative statement.⁶³ As Goldwater supporters leapt to their feet, Richard Nixon, sensing disaster, kept his wife, Pat, “in her seat.” Nixon said he became “almost physically sick” when he heard the rhetorical bombshell, adding, “Not only did Goldwater fail to close the rifts in the party and heal its wounds, he opened new wounds and then rubbed salt in them.”⁶⁴ Donald Devine said the lines were “insensitive” and “divided the party needlessly,” while Pat Hutar thought the offending passage gave Goldwater’s enemies the opportunity to say, “We told you he was an extremist.”⁶⁵ The next day, Rockefeller remarked that he was amazed and shocked: Goldwater’s approach was “dangerous, irresponsible, and frightening.”⁶⁶ Eisenhower complained that Goldwater was

“giving ‘the right-wing kooks’ a pat on the back and everyone else a slap in the face.” Many of the liberal Republicans used this speech as an excuse not to support their nominee.⁶⁷

The major media outlets almost unanimously condemned Goldwater’s “Acceptance Speech.” James Reston opined that the extremism quote was a “jumble of high-sounding contradictions.”⁶⁸ The negative reviews extended beyond a single explosive sentence, however. Walter Lippmann claimed that electing Goldwater would lead to a “global, nuclear, anti-Communist crusade.”⁶⁹ Drew Pearson declared: “The smell of fascism has been in the air at this convention.”⁷⁰ The *New York Times* editorialized that Goldwater’s nomination was “a disaster for the Republican Party and a blow to the prestige and to the domestic and international interests of the United States.”⁷¹ The *Times* believed that Goldwater had “reduced a once great party to the status of an ugly, angry, frustrated faction.”⁷²

Rhetorical Legacy

Goldwater’s electoral defeat was the most decisive since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s landslide of 1936 when he captured all but two states.⁷³ Why did Goldwater lose the election? The clearly partisan Middendorf argued that the Arizona Senator did not fail because his positions were extreme. Rather, media outlets distorted (or reported inaccurately) Goldwater’s statements on social security, nuclear weapons, and civil rights. Nonetheless, Goldwater’s opponents in the Republican primaries had attacked him on these grounds, which Democrats picked up and amplified in the general election.⁷⁴ Thus, as Kathryn Olson summarized, numerous moderates in the Republican Party saw Goldwater as dangerously radical and they did not campaign for him.⁷⁵

Without question, President Johnson conducted a hard-hitting, negative campaign against Goldwater.⁷⁶ In addition, after the shocking assassination of John F. Kennedy, much of the country yearned for continuity.⁷⁷ Building upon this, President Johnson refused to actively engage Goldwater on the contested issues. Instead, the president remained “above the fray” and effectively portrayed himself as “President of all the people.”⁷⁸ Finally, the American public shied away from Goldwater’s discourse that seemed out of step with current cultural trends. In Olson’s opinion, there was “virtually no rhetorical strategy that could overcome Johnson’s initial advantages.” Short of dramatic reversals in the military or economic fortunes of the United States, Goldwater’s rhetoric had little chance of dislodging LBJ from the White House.⁷⁹

Although Goldwater lost in the short term, his long-range influence was more profound. According to Edwards, Goldwater “affected American politics more than any other losing presidential candidate in the twentieth century.”⁸⁰ In White’s estimation, “Again and again in American history it has happened that the losers of the Presidency contributed almost as much to the permanent tone and dialogue of politics as did the winners.”⁸¹ Indeed, a convincing case can be made that Goldwater’s campaign laid the groundwork for future conservative victories. During the 1966 midterm election, for example, “the Republican Party gained 700 seats in state legislatures, 8 governorships, 47 seats in the House, and 3 seats in the Senate.”⁸² Nixon won the 1968 nomination with support from “Goldwaterites,” and Republicans went on to capture five out of six of the presidential contests after 1964.⁸³ Finally, as noted by Hammerback and Jensen, Ronald Reagan adopted and refined some of the crucial political themes pioneered by Goldwater in 1964.⁸⁴

Goldwater’s campaign fostered enduring changes to the nature of the Republican Party. For example, the heart of the party shifted from the East Coast to the West.⁸⁵ Middendorf, who

was a participant in the campaign, explained that prior to 1964 the Northeastern Republicans echoed Democratic ideology. After Goldwater's campaign, the Republican Party was significantly more conservative and "based in the Southwest."⁸⁶ Middendorf claimed, "We created the conditions that put conservative Republicans back in power after more than thirty years of domination by the liberal eastern establishment."⁸⁷ Finally, according to Trent Lott, Goldwater's 1964 campaign "actually gave birth to a future movement."⁸⁸ In the words of Edwards, "Barry Goldwater laid the foundation for a political revolution and led a generation of conservatives to understand that theirs was a winning as well as a just cause."⁸⁹ Middendorf concurred, stating, "The Goldwater campaign gave many of today's conservative politicians their first national hearing."⁹⁰

Conclusion

While Goldwater's rhetorical behavior in 1964 may seem counterproductive or irrational as normal campaign discourse, from a social movement framework, it made perfect sense. Strategies that are effective for a social movement to attract members and sustain itself are frequently not well adapted to appeal to members of the general public. Vital aspects of Goldwater's discourse were designed to increase the cohesion and commitment of true believers through identification with a heroic identity, rather than reach out to ordinary voters. Goldwater's rhetorical techniques and strategies also reflected his personality and conservative ideology. As Edwin Black explained, rhetoric contains "tokens" of personality and political ideology.⁹¹ In Goldwater's case, his use of certain metaphors, verbs, and modes of reasoning reflected a conservative worldview. For instance, the major rhetorical action of the speech was categorizing groups of people. Goldwater consistently divided Republicans and Democrats, as well as conservatives and liberals. He also used the device of association: claiming two separate entities were essentially the same. This rhetorical approach went well beyond the standard practice of comparison and contrast, which allowed for some judgmental gradations. Goldwater's use of division coerced two things into completely separate categories, while association forced diverse entities into a single class. Goldwater's way of organizing and reasoning reflected a black-and-white worldview with subtle distinctions minimized or erased. Together, association and division operated to carve out ideological space for a countercultural movement and to define, clarify, and purify conservative doctrine. In addition, the importance of the past to Goldwater's discourse reveals an individual who prized tradition, historical authority, and precedence. Such rhetoric was dedicated to revisiting the past, rather than engaging the future. Combined with the other techniques discussed in this essay, Goldwater's rhetorical habits disclose a politician who was well suited to lead a social movement but less well equipped to conduct a successful presidential campaign.

Author's Note: Carl R. Burghardt is Professor of Communication Studies at Colorado State University. An earlier version of this essay, entitled "'Extremism in the Defense of Liberty': The Countercultural Rhetoric of Barry Goldwater's 1964 Acceptance Speech," appeared in *The Rhetorical History of the United States, Vol. IX: Social Controversy and Public Address in the 1960s and Early 1970s*, edited by Richard Jensen, 291-336 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press), 2017.

Notes

¹ All passages from Goldwater's July 16, 1964, speech accepting the Republican nomination for president are cited with reference to paragraph numbers in the printed text that accompanies this essay on the VOD website.

² Lee Edwards, *Goldwater: The Man Who Made a Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1995), 274.

³ Robert D. Novak, *The Agony of the G.O.P. 1964* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), 461, 462.

⁴ John C. Hammerback, "Barry Goldwater's Rhetorical Legacy," *Southern Communication Journal* 64, no. 4 (1999): 328.

⁵ James Reston, "What Goldwater Lost," *New York Times*, November 4, 1964.

⁶ Rovere quoted in Rick Perlstein, *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), xi.

⁷ George W. Dell, "The Republican Nominee: Barry M. Goldwater," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 50 (1964): 404.

⁸ Kathryn M. Olson, "Completing the Picture: Replacing Generic Embodiments in the Historical Flow," *Communication Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (1993): 311.

⁹ Hammerback, "Rhetorical Legacy," 323, 326, 329.

¹⁰ Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays*, Trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), 161-163. Also see: James Boyd White, "Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life," *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Summer, 1985), pp. 684-702; Maurice Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73, no. 2 (1987): 133-150.

¹¹ Hammerback, "Rhetorical Legacy," 329.

¹² "Goldwater, Barry M(orris)," in *1978 Current Biography* (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1978), 165-166. Also see: Barry M. Goldwater, *With No Apologies: The Personal and Political Memoirs of United States Senator Barry M. Goldwater* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1979), 17-38.

¹³ *1978 Current Biography*, 166-167. Also see: Goldwater, *With No Apologies*, 39-93.

¹⁴ Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 61.

¹⁵ John C. Hammerback, "Barry Goldwater's Rhetoric of Rugged Individualism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 58, no. 2 (1972): 175.

¹⁶ Barry M. Goldwater with Jack Casserly, *Goldwater* (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 122-123.

¹⁷ William Middendorf II, *A Glorious Disaster: Barry Goldwater's Presidential Campaign and the Origins of the Conservative Movement* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 11.

¹⁸ *1978 Current Biography*, 166-167. Also see: *The Political Principles of Senator Barry M. Goldwater as Revealed in His Speeches and Writings: A Source Book*, ed. Leonard Schlup and James Manley (Lewiston, Maine: The Edwin Mellen Press).

¹⁹ Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President, 1964* (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1965), 103-104.

²⁰ Olson, "Completing the Picture," 307.

²¹ Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, 101.

²² Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, 102-103.

-
- ²³ White, *Making of the President*, 130-131.
- ²⁴ Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, 102.
- ²⁵ Dell, "Republican Nominee," 400.
- ²⁶ Quoted in Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, 102.
- ²⁷ Quoted in Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, 102.
- ²⁸ Quoted in Edwards, *Revolution*, 248.
- ²⁹ Goldwater, *Goldwater*, 174-175.
- ³⁰ Goldwater, *Goldwater*, 183-184
- ³¹ James Reston, "A Fortnight of Decision," *New York Times*, June 29, 1964.
- ³² Edwards, *Revolution*, 252. Also see: Hammerback, "Rugged Individualism," 177; White, *Making of the President*, 213-214; Goldwater, *Goldwater*, 126.
- ³³ Charles J. Stewart, Craig Allen Smith, and Robert E. Denton, Jr., *Persuasion and Social Movements*, 4th ed. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 2001), 12.
- ³⁴ John C. Hammerback and Richard J. Jensen, "Barry Morris Goldwater," in *American Orators of the Twentieth Century: Critical Studies and Sources*, ed. Bernard K. Duffy and Halford Ross Ryan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 175,177.
- ³⁵ Hammerback, "Rugged Individualism," 177-178.
- ³⁶ Julius Duscha, "Six Months with Goldwater," *The Progressive*, July 1964, 11-12.
- ³⁷ Dell, "Republican Nominee," 400.
- ³⁸ Ernest J. Wrage, "The Little World of Barry Goldwater," *Western Speech*, 27, no. 4 (1963): 213.
- ³⁹ Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 56, no.1 (1970): 6.
- ⁴⁰ Richard B. Gregg, "The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 4, no. 2 (1971): 74.
- ⁴¹ Gregg, "Ego-Function," 74, 82.
- ⁴² Novak, *Agony*, 453.
- ⁴³ Duscha, "Six Months with Goldwater," 12.
- ⁴⁴ Gregg, "Ego-Function," 81-82, 84, 87-88.
- ⁴⁵ Theodore Sheckels, "Conforming to and Departing from Generic Expectations: A Rhetorical Analysis of the 2008 Nomination Acceptance Speeches," Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Communication Association, Chicago, November 2009, 6-10.
- ⁴⁶ Edwards, *Revolution*, 268.
- ⁴⁷ Edwards, *Revolution*, 269.
- ⁴⁸ Goldwater, *Goldwater*, 186-187.
- ⁴⁹ Edwards, *Revolution*, 269.
- ⁵⁰ Goldwater, *Goldwater*, 186-187.
- ⁵¹ Hammerback, "Rhetorical Legacy," 327.
- ⁵² Tom Wicker, "The Issues," *New York Times*, July 19, 1964.
- ⁵³ White, *Making of the President*, 219
- ⁵⁴ "Grim Battle Cry," *Washington Post*, July 18, 1964, quoted in Dell, "Republican Nominee," 402-403.
- ⁵⁵ Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 391.
- ⁵⁶ Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 391.
- ⁵⁷ Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 391.
- ⁵⁸ Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 391.

-
- ⁵⁹ Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 392.
- ⁶⁰ *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 19, 1964, quoted in Dell, 402.
- ⁶¹ Edwards, *Revolution*, 275.
- ⁶² Edwards, *Revolution*, 275.
- ⁶³ Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 392.
- ⁶⁴ Edwards, *Revolution*, 275.
- ⁶⁵ Edwards, *Revolution*, 276.
- ⁶⁶ Earl Mazo, “‘Extremism’ Cited,” *New York Times*, July 18, 1964.
- ⁶⁷ Edwards, *Revolution*, 276.
- ⁶⁸ James Reston, “The Fight over Principles in the G.O.P.,” *New York Times*, July 19, 1964.
- ⁶⁹ Quoted in Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, 135.
- ⁷⁰ Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, 135.
- ⁷¹ Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, 135.
- ⁷² Quoted in Perlstein, *Before the Storm*, 392.
- ⁷³ Olson, “Completing the Picture,” 309.
- ⁷⁴ Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, x.
- ⁷⁵ Olson, “Completing the Picture,” 309.
- ⁷⁶ Olson, “Completing the Picture,” 309.
- ⁷⁷ Olson, “Completing the Picture,” 307.
- ⁷⁸ Olson, “Completing the Picture,” 309.
- ⁷⁹ Olson, “Completing the Picture,” 308.
- ⁸⁰ Edwards, *Revolution*, xvii.
- ⁸¹ White, *Making of the President*, 411.
- ⁸² Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, xii.
- ⁸³ Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, xii, ix.
- ⁸⁴ Hammerback and Jensen, “Barry Morris Goldwater,” 177.
- ⁸⁵ Olson, “Completing the Picture,” 311-312.
- ⁸⁶ Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, xi.
- ⁸⁷ Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, xi.
- ⁸⁸ Edwards, *Revolution*, xvii.
- ⁸⁹ Edwards, *Revolution*, xvii.
- ⁹⁰ Middendorf, *A Glorious Disaster*, xi.
- ⁹¹ Edwin Black, “The Second Persona,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 56, no. 2 (1970): 112.