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Abstract: Robert Sargent Shriver remains underappreciated in most standard histories of the 1960s despite playing important roles in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This essay explores Shriver as an important voice of democracy whose advocacy exemplified enduring themes of citizenship and civic identity. The April 1966 speech was delivered to a skeptical audience of poverty activists and illustrates Shriver’s ongoing efforts to negotiate the terms of “maximum feasible participation” in the War on Poverty. The manner in which Shriver contextualized dissent and contestation in the speech, and the metaphors he used to frame the proper role of the citizen in the War on Poverty, extended beyond the specifics of the poverty program and reflected enduring tensions between citizen participation and representative democracy.

Keywords: Sargent Shriver; War on Poverty; Office of Economic Opportunity; Community Action; Maximum Feasible Participation; Citizenship and Civic Identity

As a back-up second baseman for Yale University, Robert Sargent Shriver once entered late in a pre-season exhibition game to face a minor-league pitcher for the Washington Senators. He struck out on three pitches. With the type of trademark optimism for which he was widely known during his fifty-year public career, Shriver convinced himself that the pitcher must be an all-star prospect, undoubtedly destined for greatness. But there was always a realist side of Shriver as well, a balancing of optimism and honesty, his idealism tempered by hard truths. Indeed, Shriver would later acknowledge that the legendary at-bat was actually a rather middling matchup: “the next day I was back on the bench at Yale,” Shriver recalled, “and that pitcher was sent down to a Class ‘D’ team—the lowest level in organized baseball. Neither one of us ever got higher!”

If Shriver was no Jackie Robinson on the baseball field, he would later find himself measured against the baseball icon in a wholly different arena. Just weeks before the 1960 presidential election, Martin Luther King, Jr. was arrested for taking part in a student protest in Atlanta, Georgia. King was taken into custody and reportedly transferred several times to various locations. With only cryptic news reports immediately available, many feared for King’s safety. Robinson, the first African American to play in Major League Baseball, was a long-time Republican and Richard Nixon supporter. Recognizing the circumstances as an opportunity for Nixon, he approached the candidate to intervene and to express support for King. Nixon declined, saying that to get involved at that point in the campaign would only be “grandstanding.” Dejected, Robinson reportedly walked away from the encounter with tears in his eyes, saying “Nixon doesn’t deserve to win.”

Remarkably, Shriver found himself in a similar situation. Harris Wofford, a member of Kennedy’s campaign team, approached Shriver about facilitating a phone call to Coretta Scott King to express Kennedy’s support for King and his family. Virtually all of Kennedy’s advisors were steadfastly against the idea, including Robert Kennedy, who was furious at Shriver for even broaching the subject. But Shriver went over Bobby’s head, made the case directly to candidate...
Kennedy, dialed the number, spoke to Coretta Scott King, and put the future president on the line. The call produced far less southern backlash than was expected and far more good will from the black community than could have been hoped. Some believe it may have tipped the tide in the extremely close presidential election of 1960.4

This anecdote is emblematic of the understated leadership and behind-the-scenes influence of Robert Sargent Shriver. After distinguishing himself both at Yale University and in the US Navy, Shriver held significant posts in two presidential administrations. While his influence was often behind the scenes, he was also an articulate public spokesperson for the ideals of the Kennedy administration and public service more generally. In 1965 Shriver was featured on the cover of Newsweek, and he became a minor celebrity as the public spokesman for Kennedy’s Peace Corps and Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty. From presidential campaigns to public policy, Shriver’s influence in Washington in the 1960s is hard to overstate. As biographer Scott Stossel has noted, “a good case can be made that Shriver, through the programs he started and ran, and through the generation of public servants he inspired, may have positively affected more people around the world than any twentieth century American who was not a President or other major elected official or Martin Luther King.”5

Shriver remains underappreciated not just historically, but also rhetorically. There is very little published on Shriver’s discourse, his campaign or policy speeches, or his public role in defining the idealism of the 1960s. This essay addresses this absence by exploring Shriver as an important voice of democracy whose advocacy consistently exemplified enduring themes of citizenship and civic identity. While a number of speeches and public pronouncements would be worthy candidates for analysis given the breadth and depth of Shriver’s career, this paper focuses on one of his more interesting and controversial speeches: an address to the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty in Washington, D.C., in April of 1966.

Shriver’s speech to the Citizens Crusade was not particularly well received by its immediate audience. The activists within the organization had grown impatient with the War on Poverty, and they greeted Shriver with boos and even some heckling. Yet, that does not mean that the speech was unsuccessful, unimportant, or unworthy of analysis. Indeed, I argue that it represents a crucial turning point in (re)defining one of the central concepts underlying 1960s activism: citizen participation in American democracy. I contend that the way Shriver contextualized citizen dissent in the speech, and the metaphors he used to frame the War on Poverty, reflected enduring tensions between citizen participation and representative democracy that have existed since the nation’s founding. As they have throughout American history, these tensions still underlie our political discourse today.

I begin this essay with a brief biography of Shriver, including his marriage to Eunice Kennedy, the third eldest daughter and fifth of nine children of Joseph and Rose Kennedy. I then situate Shriver’s role in politics within the context of his service to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, focusing on his leadership of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) during the War on Poverty. Of course, Shriver’s relationship to the Kennedys—both by marriage and by virtue of his role as spokesman for Kennedy’s Peace Corps program—helps explain why Johnson selected him for a key role in the War on Poverty. This background helps us to understand Shriver as both a rhetor and a leader in the War on Poverty. Shriver’s speech to the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty illustrates some of the central tensions Shriver had to negotiate throughout the War on Poverty. His notions of “community action” and “maximum feasible participation” provide interesting case studies in how the relationship between citizenship and democracy was understood by Shriver and other progressives at the time.
In my analysis of the 1966 speech, I identify three central themes, each supported by a framing metaphor. First, Shriver encouraged his audience to look at the “total picture,” or the broader context of success in the War Against Poverty. Second, he described the poverty program as an unstoppable “movement,” in which participation provided lessons in bridging divides and collectively solving problems. And third, Shriver described how the “maximum participation” called for in anti-poverty legislation was dependent on citizens abiding by a “social contract,” an implicit agreement that requires restraint and mutual cooperation within a set of established norms. I explore each of these themes in the speech and with a secondary focus on how the explicit and implicit metaphors Shriver employed framed a broader understanding of citizen action. That understanding rested on traditional norms of unity and consensus rather than concerns with the agency of individual citizens. I conclude by illustrating the importance of understanding the tension between the ideal of active citizenship and the conformist demands of participation in a representative democracy.

Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr (1915 –2011)

Robert Sargent Shriver, or Sarge to his friends, was born November 9, 1915, in Westminster, Maryland, just outside of Baltimore. He was the second son of Robert Sargent Shriver, Sr., and Hilda Shriver (Robert Sr. and Hilda shared surnames as second cousins). Shriver’s Catholic upbringing and faith remained strong throughout his life. He attended mass daily and was a devout Catholic throughout his public career. While attending prep school at Canterbury School in New Milford, Connecticut, he would cross paths with his future brother-in-law and US President John F. Kennedy. Shriver attended Yale University, graduating with an undergraduate degree in 1938 and a law degree in 1941. Despite opposing America’s entry into World War II as a founding member of America First movement, Shriver enlisted in the US Navy before Pearl Harbor, eventually rising to the level of lieutenant commander. He was awarded the Purple Heart for his actions aboard USS South Dakota during a key battle at Guadalcanal.6

After the war, Shriver briefly practiced law before turning to the world of politics and public life as an associate editor of Newsweek magazine. The position led him to encounters with Joe Kennedy, who asked Shriver to look over a collection of letters from Joe Jr., who was killed in action during WWII. While Shriver reluctantly reported back that the diaries contained little literary value, the experience introduced him to one of the most influential figures of the twentieth century.7 Shriver would soon find himself managing the largest commercial building in the world, the Kennedy-owned Chicago Merchandise Mart, and developing a growing relationship with the boss’s daughter as a result. Shriver married into arguably the most influential American family of the 20th century on May 23, 1953, at an elaborate wedding for 1,700 guests and dignitaries at St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York City. For a Shriver family of decidedly modest means, the wedding was a lavish affair. As Shriver would learn throughout his life, this type of Kennedy influence would cut both ways. It is easy to imagine Shriver never reaching the national stage without the family connections. At the same time, the Kennedy family, both covertly and overtly, thwarted other initiatives that might have led Shriver to even higher levels of national prominence. As Stossel writes about the Kennedy’s impact on Shriver: “They buoyed him up to heights and achievements he would never otherwise have attained, and they held him back, thwarting his political advancement.”8
In some ways, Shriver’s impact is lost to history simply because he never held elected office himself. As early as 1960, Shriver was regarded as a leading candidate for the governorship of Illinois, a position that he knew would afford him more freedom to forge his own path outside of the Kennedy-dominated Washington, DC. But Joe Kennedy thwarted the idea, saying 1960 was Jack’s year and that Shriver would be needed in service of his brother-in-law’s campaign.

After the election, Shriver was handpicked by President Kennedy to lead the Peace Corps. Kennedy envisioned the program as a means of capitalizing on the youthful idealism of American college students in particular. Shriver played a central role in filling in the details and developing the program despite initial skepticism if not outright opposition to what some deemed Kennedy’s unrealistic and naïve pet program. His role as Peace Corps director would catapult Shriver to national prominence. After President Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, Lyndon Johnson wanted Shriver to play an even more prominent role in his administration. LBJ might even have tapped Shriver as his vice president were it not for concerns about the relationship with the Kennedy family. The well-known “mutual contempt” between Robert Kennedy and Johnson endured for years, with Shriver occasionally serving as a lightning rod for feelings on both sides.9

With Bobby considering his own bid for the White House in 1968, Shriver was again considered for the VP post by eventual nominee Hubert H. Humphrey. When Shriver accepted Johnson’s invitation to serve as Ambassador to France, he was effectively out of the electoral politics of 1968. He finally did appear on the national ticket in 1972, after the resignation of George McGovern’s first pick, Thomas Eagleton, but that campaign was destined for failure. Shriver launched a short-lived presidential campaign in 1976, but for the most part he spent the remainder of his life outside of the political arena. Shriver was the handsome, well-spoken, idealistic spokesperson for a number of Kennedy and Johnson initiatives, but his own political career was limited both by historical circumstance and by his association with the Kennedy family.

Shriver would continue to work in various capacities in government while spending more and more time with his wife Eunice’s favorite cause, the Special Olympics program. Sarge had been involved with the program throughout the 1960s, as shown in Eunice’s notes from that period, but he began to assume a more prominent role in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1984, Shriver was named president of the Special Olympics. The program, which originally emerged from an informal gathering known as “Camp Shriver,” continued to expand its advocacy and programming for those with intellectual and physical disabilities. By the end of his career, many people recognized Sargent Shriver more for his work with the Special Olympics than for his political career.

In 2003, Shriver was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s, a battle that was recounted in his son Timothy Shriver’s book, A Good Man: Rediscovering My Father, Sargent Shriver, and daughter Maria Shriver’s children’s book, “What’s happening to Grandpa?” Many of Shriver’s five children continue to fight for Alzheimer’s education and eradication today, including Ms. Shriver, who helped establish the Women’s Alzheimer’s Movement at the Cleveland Clinic in 2020.

Shriver died on January 18, 2011, at the age of 95. Former President Bill Clinton and Vice President Joe Biden eulogized Shriver, while celebrity friends Bono and Stevie Wonder provided music for the public memorial at Our Lady of Mercy Catholic Church in Potomac, Maryland. President Barack Obama called Shriver “one of the brightest lights of the greatest
generation,” saying Shriver “embodied public service.”10 The Yale Daily News, where Shriver debuted and cultivated his democratic voice, called Shriver “an icon of a generation.”11

“Mr. Poverty”

After the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, Lyndon Baines Johnson navigated a delicate balance between continuing the Kennedy legacy and forging his own path to establish his own legacy. In a series of speeches throughout the early part of 1964, most notably the spring commencement address at the University of Michigan, Johnson laid out his vision for his Great Society. In declaring a “War on Poverty,” Johnson championed a cause that was uniquely his own and set a cornerstone from which to build his Great Society. Johnson saw the broad question of poverty as a defining issue, its elimination a way to demonstrate his worthiness as a successor not just to JFK but to FDR as well. When the new president was presented the initial plans that included limited pilot programs to encourage active participation by the poor communities that were most impacted by the legislation, Johnson felt the approach too timid and demanded something that would be “big and bold and hit the whole nation with real impact.”12

Johnson’s choice of Shriver as a Special Assistant to the President for poverty programs was informed and complicated by a variety of political and familial considerations. Shriver’s appointment suggested that Johnson, at least, initially viewed the War on Poverty as a domestic corollary to the Peace Corps, especially in terms of engaging American citizens in the effort. Shriver himself had a “special talent for identifying his message with the needs of his audience,”13 as David Zarefsky has noted, and he proved a “force” in “eliciting public support” for LBJ’s anti-poverty program.14 Yet to say that Shriver did not seek the post would be an understatement. His heart was with the Peace Corps, and he felt the international service program was at a crucial period where his leadership was needed. But Johnson wasn’t taking no for an answer, saying, “if you can’t run a $100 million program in your left hand and a $1 billion with your right hand, you’re not as smart as I think you are.” “You’re Mr. Poverty,” LBJ declared during the same phone call with Shriver on February 1, 1964, and by October, Shriver was leading a newly created Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) that oversaw all of the programs of the War on Poverty.15

As head of the OEO, Shriver’s principal “weapon” was local community action programs. Provisions of the authorizing Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 explicitly required community action programs to include “maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served,”16 yet the specifics of what this meant or how participation would be enacted were entirely unclear. For some administrators—many remaining from the Kennedy administration—cultivating the direct participation of the impacted citizenry was an important strategy. Citizens were invited to participate in the anti-poverty effort not simply to garner good will or as token representatives, but to activate their own awareness and consciousness, even encourage the type of criticism and activism that would highlight long-term systemic problems. Supporters of this view of community action, such as the Deputy Director of the OEO, Jack Conway, had a view of citizenship quite different from that of Johnson or most other traditional politicians. Daniel Patrick Moynihan described the distinction quite simply: “Where the President hoped to help the poor, Conway wished to arouse them.”17

In the early stages of the War on Poverty, political norms and bureaucratic structures undermined grass-roots participation and community action. Seeing the War on Poverty as a serendipitous windfall of federal largesse, mayors and other local officials secured poverty funds
through the existing machineries of the bureaucratic state. Participation of the poor provided a reassuring and rhetorically useful theme for building public support and good will, but most local officials assumed that it would not impact traditional political processes or the role of poor people in those processes. In fact, Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggests that among lawmakers, the primary understanding of the “maximum feasible participation” provision of the new anti-poverty legislation was intended to ensure that state and local legislators, in the South particularly, would not exclude African American citizens from “participating” in the benefits of the program. It was not viewed as a threat to local control of those anti-poverty programs, nor a means by which citizens could upset the traditional enactment of democracy through representative institutions. Moynihan writes: “It was taken as a matter beneath notice that such programs would be dominated by the local political structure.”

As citizen recruitment within some community action agencies activated participation among the poor themselves, controversy ensued. As Director of OEO, Shriver was appointed by Johnson and beholden to Congress for funding, but he was simultaneously committed to an authentic sense of maximum feasible participation. He was an administrator in practice but an idealist by nature; he clearly recognized the importance of cultivating an authentic form of participation, arguing for accepting and even encouraging the criticism and dissent that would surely come from members of the poor community. Unlike Johnson and the vast majority of elected officials, Shriver did more than pay lip service to the involvement of the poor in the program. He sought to arouse and activate a new type of citizen agency among the poor.

In several speeches leading up to the April speech to the Citizens Crusade, Shriver spoke about accepting criticism as part of the process and insisted on the “need to maintain direct contact with the sense of immediacy, of urgency, of desperation that comes from the poor when they speak in their own words in ways that have meaning to them.” Encouraging this type of activism would lead to what Shriver called a “great national dialogue about the most fundamental values and premises of American life.” Shriver was quick to note such a “dialogue” would not automatically produce all “sweetness and light,” but he nevertheless emphasized the need “to involve the poor, to utilize their insights, to harness their energies, and to heed their criticism.” Addressing the National Committee for Community Development in Washington in March of 1965, for example, Shriver argued: “This program cannot succeed if that process does not go on—if the poor do not participate—even when participation means criticism.” He concluded: “We all know that process isn’t easy. Calling it coordination won’t make it easy. That’s like telling a Roman Charioteer to coordinate a team of wild horses.”

Elsewhere, Shriver responded to critics who argued that the administration was actually financing activists opposed to the very programs that funded their activities. Shriver candidly and courageously defended doing just that, arguing that “we are still ready to finance dissent and criticism.” He reminded an audience in Chicago that to do otherwise would be to “shut one’s eyes—to bar the door, to play it safe.” Shriver invoked T. S. Elliot to make his case, recalling a scene from “Murder in the Cathedral” in which St. Thomas insisted that the priests “unbar the door” to criticism rather than shy away from it. Shriver concluded: “That is why we—you—all of us—must unbar the door. That is what maximum feasible participation really means.”

Shriver’s description of community action recognized the difficulties inherent to this type of citizen participation, yet he insisted that such involvement was dictated by both the authorizing legislation and larger democratic principles.

During the early part of the War on Poverty, consensual and conflictual elements of citizenship thus operated in tandem. Many community action programs were working more
closely together with local authorities than anticipated. At the same time, the most publicized incidents of conflict between citizens and local authorities highlighted the links between the War on Poverty’s notion of “community action” and the larger protests for civil rights, student rights, women’s rights, and opposition to the war in Vietnam. Zarefsky frames it simply: “the persistent ambiguity surrounding community action . . . cost [the administration] control of the war.” As a result, as James Morone has argued, “the mirage of community consensus evaporated,” and community action became defined in the public mind as confrontation. For all of Johnson’s talk of community and a Great Society, OEO’s sponsorship of community action programs was increasingly perceived as a cause rather than a solution to racial and class strife, particularly as press reports focused on highly visible conflicts in larger cities. As public criticism of the War on Poverty in general and community action in particular grew louder in the spring of 1966, Shriver chose to speak to a gathering of community activists that included many critics of the administration.

Citizens Crusade Against Poverty Conference, April 14, 1966

Tapped by Johnson to lead the War on Poverty precisely because of his political acumen and the fact he represented cherished ideals like service and participation, Shriver’s speech on April 14, 1966, would put all of his skills to the test. The Citizens Crusade Against Poverty, established with the financial support of UAW and AFL-CIO leader Walter Reuther, was comprised of a coalition of well-known and emerging activists and local leaders, and reflected a growing unease with traditional methods of advocacy. By 1966, debates over the most effective method of protesting systemic injustices were not uncommon and played themselves out in a variety of different contexts. A change in leadership at the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) reflected a more aggressive stance, as did a growing impatience at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the emergence of National Organization for Women (NOW), and the heightened intensity of student and anti-war efforts. At the same time, none of these other groups or issues were themselves being funded or directly supported by the federal government. With the traditional lines between agitators and establishment blurred by the unique arrangement of the community action program, Shriver faced a difficult rhetorical situation as he sought to balance these competing forces.

The frustrations of many community action groups were heightened by their sense that systemic change and authentic community participation were needed. Community action programs gained legitimacy from the OEO and “saw themselves as government-supported advocates for the poor, not as adjudicators of competing political needs.” As advocates for the poor, they often lacked interest in forging compromises or building coalitions with the political establishment. Thus, the conflict between the OEO and the activist groups laid bare previously obscured power disparities of a more traditional variety. In theory, these groups were authorized and legitimated by the OEO. In practice, the more they engaged in social critiques, the more they appeared as an “out-group” rather than part of a coordinated partnership.

As the OEO and at least some community action groups were becoming more and more polarized, a more direct and concerted attempt to control dissent might have been an understandable administrative response. This was certainly the path chosen by other government officials in response to civil unrest during this period. But, again, the unique nature of community action as a government-sponsored program rendered the control strategy imprudent. Zarefsky argues, “It would have been rhetorically unwise to repress protest.” Repression would
have “revealed what the militants regarded as the true colors of the political structure.” Some agitators, such as Saul Alinsky, had already strongly criticized Shriver and the entire poverty program as “political pornography” only interested in keeping citizens quiet. What was needed, Zarefsky argues, was a form of “defensive symbolic maneuver” that didn’t materially change policy as much as negotiate symbolic understandings and thereby alleviate or reframe direct oppositional attacks.

Pointing to Bachrach and Baratz’s notion of a “nondecision decision,” Zarefsky gives an example of one such “symbolic maneuver”: establishing a “blue ribbon panel” to investigate the problem, which creates the appearance of decisive action even if there is no tangible change in policy. Stewart, Smith, and Denton refer to such defensive strategies as attempts to buy time, save face, and appear gracious. In the War on Poverty, some poor citizens were invited to sit on local boards as “participants” even though they served without any tangible power and had no real impact on the board’s deliberations or decision making. Other examples might include minor adjustments or token concessions that respond to demands of activist groups in a way that maintains control while rhetorically appearing to cede ground.

In the pages that follow, I detail how Shriver’s speech exemplified these sorts of defensive symbolic maneuvers. Employing metaphors that framed citizenship and participation in a way that privileged consensual norms, Shriver’s speech afforded room for conflict and criticism, yet it also “revealed the key terms and equations” of the War on Poverty, inviting “maximum feasible participation” by the poor while limiting the types of expression deemed feasible in practice. By invoking common-sense assumptions about American citizenship, Shriver’s speech not only addressed the specific historical moment of April 1966, but illustrated fairly common understandings of legitimate types of political expression.

**Speech Analysis**

Shriver’s speech negotiated the tension between increasing pressures from traditional politicians who felt community action had gone too far and poverty advocates who felt that not enough had been done. The speech unfolded as follows: Shriver began by noting the context of the previous day’s agitation at the opening of the Citizen’s Crusade conference. He acknowledged the depth of dissatisfaction but reminded his audience that President Johnson proposed the program (clearly implying that he deserved some credit for doing so) and that continued success depended on developing an approach where American citizens were able to judge the poverty effort favorably. After setting the terms of what was at stake in continuing to support the War on Poverty, Shriver enumerated the successes of the program, from the number of people served to specific advances in different areas, including Head Start, Upward Bound, and Job Centers.

To understand the themes in this speech, it is useful to appreciate the metaphors Shriver employed to frame his understanding of citizenship and civic identity. First, Shriver described how the “total picture” revealed that while there was dissatisfaction with some aspects of the program, the larger context showed that significant progress had been made and consensus had been forged. This “total picture” required understanding the War on Poverty in a broader, even international context. Second, Shriver argued that the OEO has spearheaded a “movement” that was teaching America a lesson in democracy. This movement acknowledged the legitimacy of criticism and even controversy, while working toward a better, more unified, and more legitimate form of democracy. Finally, Shriver sought to clarify the idea of “maximum feasible
participation” in the nation’s poverty programs. Here Shriver compared maximum participation to a “social contract,” where in exchange for benefits, participants adhered to procedural norms, accepted gradualism, and exercised restraint.

The Total Picture: Dissatisfaction in Light of Progress

When Shriver arrived at the International Inn on Thursday, April 14, 1966, he was well aware of an undercurrent of impatience and opposition within the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty. Shriver made light of this tension in his opening remarks: “I'm not sure whether I've been invited here for lunch or as lunch. But for those who I know you have got the grill and I'm the hamburger—freshly ground yesterday and ready to be cooked today” (1).35 Facing a skeptical, if not hostile audience presents a rhetorical challenge where speakers must balance arguments, appeals, and their own ethos in a manner specific to the rhetorical situation. Sargent Shriver’s reputation for emphasizing American ideals, particularly as they relate to his years with the Peace Corps and the Kennedy administration, was arguably not as well suited to an audience dissatisfied with the progress made in the War on Poverty. Shriver embraced their dissatisfaction as natural, inevitable, and understandable. At the same time, he reminded his audience of the program’s larger successes. Shriver stated: “because in the process of voicing your concerns and our grievances, there are some things about the poverty program—true things—facts—which we tend to lose sight of. All of us have worked too hard to be willing to let only our dissatisfactions stand as the total picture of the poverty program” (2). He continued: “Yes, I am dissatisfied. But I am not ashamed of what has been done. Nor do I apologize to anyone here or elsewhere about this program” (3).

Shriver situated himself—and by extension the Johnson administration—as sharing in the dissatisfaction, acknowledging room for improvement. By placing this as only a part of the picture, however, Shriver minimized the dissatisfaction, which was a critical step toward the American public seeing the program in a positive light. Shriver reminded his audience of this central fact: “The poverty program is coming to a time of verdict—a national verdict. The American people—all of the American people are sitting in judgment on our program” (5). As part of this, he broadened the parameters and insisted that the burden of Vietnam was also an element of this larger picture: “Each night they watch American boys die on their television screens. Two weeks ago, I was at the Air Force Academy and one of the questions uppermost in their minds was about the funds we are spending in the War on Poverty increasing the likelihood that they might die” (6). By describing the War on Poverty as part of a larger whole, Shriver minimized the impact of dissenting voices and redirected attention to both program successes and larger political realities.

Broadening the context and viewing the larger picture served many rhetorical purposes. John Murphy’s analysis of the Freedom Riders in the early 1960s illustrates the ways in which dissent can be “domesticated” and minimized through such contextualization.36 While the original response to Freedom Riders categorized them as a response to racism in the segregated south, the context soon shifted to the world stage. From Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s statement that our domestic conflicts could be harmful to the larger fight against communism to more direct attacks on the riders for embarrassing the government, recontextualizing the Freedom Riders highlighted larger issues and framed dissent within a broader context. Shriver’s reminder that the War on Poverty would be viewed in the context of international affairs served to limit dissent in service of a broader public good.
This attempt to marginalize criticism by emphasizing the “larger picture” also recalls Theodore Roosevelt’s 1906 speech to progressive-era reformers at the laying of the cornerstone at what is now the Canon Office Building. In that speech, “The Man with the Muckrake,” Roosevelt denounced the reformer who “consistently refuses to see aught that is lofty and fixes his eyes with solemn intentness only on that which is vile and debasing.” Roosevelt maintained that he welcomed criticism and dissent as long as they looked at the larger picture and did not lose sight of progress and good work. In characteristic language, Roosevelt stated: “If the whole picture is painted black there remains no hue whereby to single out the rascals for distinction from their fellows.” Shriver offered a similar perspective, spending a considerable portion of his speech listing the accomplishments of the War on Poverty and downplaying its shortcomings.

Shriver’s goal in this speech was to illustrate the successes of the War on Poverty while explaining what citizens might do to move the initiative forward. Given the increased criticism, Shriver reminded supporters that continued success depended in part on a favorable public disposition toward the program. He made the connection to Vietnam explicit by saying the American public would judge the program and “render a verdict” about its value. This was the “total picture” that Shriver sought to keep at the forefront. Criticism was welcomed, accepted, and necessary as long as the “total picture” included both program successes and the larger international context of the program.

Rhetorical scholars have long looked at metaphors such as “total picture” as more than mere ornamentation, but rather as ways of constituting reality through differently structured associations. Indeed, the metaphor of “war” itself had a host of rhetorical repercussions. Zarefsky argues that Johnson’s war metaphor emphasized “such positive attributes as national unity, total mobilization of effort, selfless dedication to a cause, and all-out assault on the foe.” The reception of these positive themes was facilitated by the metaphors that served as “structuring principles” to aid common understandings. Of course, the war metaphor had its downsides as well, including unrealizable expectations for victory, but the early themes of a selfless, unified, and committed response to a common foe was useful in securing public awareness of a problem most Americans scarcely acknowledged. The metaphor of “total picture” is more limited than an “unconditional war,” of course. It aimed not to erase or eliminate criticism but to restructure it as a smaller part of a larger whole. Progress in eliminating poverty might initially be disappointing, but viewed within the “total picture” of tangible successes, the War on Poverty was worth the investment.

The “total picture” was but one of Shriver’s metaphors framing his discussion of the War on Poverty. Another was his description of the progress being made as an unstoppable “movement,” not just the result of effective administrative planning. As such, he presented the program as the product of an engaged citizenry and a vibrant, healthy, and consensual democracy.

An Unstoppable Movement: Lessons in Consensual Democracy

In contextualizing the successes of the War on Poverty program in larger considerations both domestic and international, Shriver emphasized specific policy successes in alleviating poverty. In addition to these policy goals, he also emphasized how including the poor directly in the democratic process advanced larger goals of enhancing democracy. These dual goals—policy success and democratic renewal—were in theory intertwined, but in practice they were almost wholly separated and rhetorically distinct in Shriver’s speech. Shriver unintentionally created a bifurcation between policy goals and process goals, between success toward eliminating poverty
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and success toward cultivating a stronger democracy. A long litany of statistics was cited to
illustrate the number of people served and the money spent on various programs. For several
minutes, Shriver illustrated in specific detail the OEO’s accomplishments. Conversely, when
Shriver spoke to the process goals of encouraging participation, success was defined in terms of
working together to collectively solve problems. Criticism and controversy were continually
mentioned, but Shriver never cited a productive controversy, a well-taken criticism, or a protest
that contributed to policy improvements.

Shriver’s framing of the OEO as part of a larger “movement” suggested grassroots
participation and citizen action. Shriver stated: “. . . we have started a movement. No one can
stop it! OEO can't! The Citizens' Crusade can't, and you can't, even if you wanted to” (10).
Shriver reminded his audience that the active, growing movement clearly began from above:
“But let us not forget who started this movement. I didn’t. And you didn’t. And neither did the
Citizens' Crusade. Lyndon Johnson proposed it, and the U.S. Congress authorized it” (11). He
then established the breadth of support the movement enjoyed: “And the American people have
endorsed it—rich Americans, prosperous Americans—just as much as poor Americans” (11).
Shriver continued by listing additional endorsements: “Mayors and Governors have endorsed it
and so have social workers and religious leaders—just as much as the poor. And we're not going
to have a total war against poverty without help from everybody. We're getting that help. And
that's why this movement will not be stopped” (12).

Moving beyond the array of groups that had endorsed the movement, Shriver emphasized
the democratic renewal that was occurring, making the bold claim that “Head Start during the
first summer integrated more school districts in the South than were integrated in the ten years
after Brown v. Board of Education” (30). Shriver stated: “We see Negro and white Board
member of Community Action programs sitting down to talk for the first time” (32). He cited
religious groups that were working together in unprecedented ways: “In San Antonio, Texas, a
Jewish synagogue rented a hall to a Lutheran church group to conduct pre-school classes for kids
from a predominantly Catholic area” (37). From contentious issues like birth control to
philosophical debates on the separation of church and state, the War on Poverty was helping to
alleviate these divisions. Shriver stated: “And there are other divisions—deep spiritual
divisions—which are slowly healing. That’s what the issue called involvement of the poor is
really all about” (42).

The metaphor of an unstoppable movement and the momentum that implied allowed the
OEO to acknowledge the value of conflict while framing consensus as the natural and inevitable
ideal moving forward. First, the broad range of endorsement—rich, poor, governors, and social
workers—illustrated such consensus. Second, the unstoppable movement was doing more than
providing solutions to poverty; it was teaching lessons in democracy and how to collectively
work together. Shriver stated:

This program has helped to teach this nation a lesson in democracy—a lesson that will
stick. And that lesson says that democracy doesn't just stop with a vote! Democracy has
to go all the way through our society—from the way that we plan our programs to, the
way we staff and run them—that goes for education, for job training, for job placement,
for legal services, for consumer education, for pre-school education. That principle is
sinking deeper and deeper, broader, and broader. And it will continue to spread and
spread (23).
In providing a context for participation beyond voting, Shriver adopted an expansive view of citizen agency even while contextualizing activism within a consensus-building frame.

Rhetorically, framing the War on Poverty as an unstoppable “movement” functioned much like the metaphor of the “total picture.” It structured perceptions of the program in ways that managed dissent and criticism as acceptable but possibly counter-productive. Of course, by employing the metaphor of movement, Shriver wasn’t suggesting that the OEO or other government agencies were actually grass-roots social movements, but the metaphor did convey a sense of momentum, growth, unity, and urgency in a common cause. As Zarefsky has written: “Groups in power may see themselves as ‘movements’ in order that greater significance may be attached to their actions.”

Shriver’s framing metaphors thus offered a broad picture of success and a growing consensus behind a “movement” to end poverty. These metaphors helped Shriver negotiate the inherent tensions within the movement while structuring the most prudent response in this particular context. A final metaphor employed by Shriver was similarly successful in framing a key concept in the administration’s War on Poverty: the idea of “maximum feasible participation.” This Shriver did by invoking the idea of a social contract.

Abide by the Contract: Gradualism and the Feasibility of Maximum Participation

The concluding section of Shriver’s speech set out to do what legislators neglected to do at the onset of the War on Poverty: define “maximum feasible participation.” Shriver admitted to the problem: “Maximum feasible participation is not the simplest phrase in the world to interpret or to implement” (49). He stated: “We believe that to listen to criticism, and to respond to the needs of the people, especially the poor and the helpless, is the heart of democracy—not to listen undermines democracy” (44). Shriver acknowledged the difficulties, saying that “the job of securing authentic and viable involvement of the poor is difficult” (48). He continued: “The discontent of the poor is explosive. The poor are dissatisfied—deeply dissatisfied. And in enacting the poverty program this society said that the poor have a right to be dissatisfied in this rich nation of ours” (51).

Shriver established the need for maximum and authentic citizen participation in a manner that was consistent with both the “total picture” and the unstoppable “movement.” He did so by offering yet another metaphor in the closing section of the speech: the social “contract.” Shriver stated: “It’s like the discontent of labor union members who want higher wages and shorter hours. Like members of a union, the poor may not get all they want as fast as they want. But the reason that labor union members are willing to settle for less than what they want is because they feel fairly represented—because they feel they got the best deal they could” (51). He continues by making the metaphor of a contract even more explicit: “we are asking the poor to live under a social contract! That contract is a contract with all 200,000,000 Americans” (53). In typical fashion, Shriver balanced the participation rights of citizens—in this case insisting on a form of fair representation—with the larger systemic demands of the poverty program. A “contract” metaphor frames this balance explicitly as a form of exchange between two entities, complete with implied agreements to abide by the rules and regulations of the exchange.

Anita Allen’s research on metaphors of the social contract in legal settings is particularly instructive here. In general terms, Allen reminds us how metaphors are used: “As metaphor,
social contract rhetoric is a vehicle for moving language beyond the limitations of literal speech. Metaphorical speech shapes how we view reality; indeed, what we regard as reality.” More specifically, she argues that judicial opinions utilize social contract metaphors when state interests trump individual claims. Allen notes that “judges evoke the idea of the social contract to package as good news what is bound to be received as bad news to losing litigants,” a process made possible by redirecting attention to the social contract as an exchange between individual and society. This frames the individual loss within the context of a larger societal necessity.

As such, judicial uses of contract metaphors reframe the relationship between individual and institution. For example, Allen cites how an individual petitioner in a persistent vegetative state might be denied the right to purposefully end his or her life because the state claims a larger obligation to protect the sanctity of life. Other individuals may lose individual claims on the basis of even more ambiguously defined state interests. Indeed, social contract language often illustrates how ostensibly equal partners in exchanges actually don’t share equal power and the terms of their exchanges can sometimes be unfair. Allen argues that antebellum courts actually used social contract metaphor to "validate" slavery by characterizing blacks as either 1) outside of the American social contract and therefore not a party to claims; or 2) as parties to a social contract under which they consented to bondage in exchange for protection. To be clear, depicting slavery as a “social contract” is not a defensible logic or analogous to the present argument. But Allen illustrates how this social contract metaphor can blunt the coercive and oppressive aspects of law with a metaphorical frame that disguises the disparities. The contract metaphor, Allen argues, thus works in both directions. In a positive light, the “social contract can foster the spirit of cooperation and compromise.” At the same time, it sometimes “masks judicial and other governmental coercion in a cloak of consensualism and rational self-interest.”

Shriver extended the contract metaphor provocatively by addressing the debilitating consequences of citizens not abiding a contract: “This total American society can't afford wildcat strikes in the industrial arena even less can it afford a wildcat strike on the entire social order—and that's what Watts was!” (54). Shriver described the disturbances in Watts as a “wildcat” strike to illustrate the consequences of not working within the frame of an implied social contract. Again, Shriver balanced the tension between institutional demands and citizen expectations by emphasizing the need for fair representation, but he focused on self-restraint of the citizen as the ultimate way to achieve balance:

And if we do avoid such strikes, it will be because the poor act with the same self-restraint that we expect of labor union members. But for that to happen, we must see the same concepts of fair representation, of open bargaining between equals applied to the poor. Unless the poor believe that society is dealing with them fairly. Unless they believe that they have been represented fairly—some of the main incentive for self-restraint will have been removed (55).

Shriver concluded that the entire enterprise depended on a specific type of citizen: “Alone, OEO cannot make maximum feasible participation work by itself any more than government can make democracy work. No one can protect the citizenry against itself, but itself. And that is why this must be, in the broadest sense, a citizens’ War Against Poverty” (57).

Shriver’s inclusion of Watts as an example of a wildcat strike illustrates how the contract metaphor both frames and is framed by understandings of citizenship. Shriver’s invocation illustrated the importance of restrained citizenship, setting parameters for acceptable (and
acceptable) actions. While insisting that maximum participation was necessary to move forward, Shriver urged a restrained commitment to order, consensus, and gradualism. Sometimes it might be necessary to settle for less, or as Shriver put it, to “live with a less than perfect contract until the next time for negotiations comes around” (52). “Wildcat strikes,” he implied, were outside the realm of acceptable citizen action because of their unpredictability, impulsiveness, and divisiveness. There were better, more rational, and more measured ways that citizens could bring about change. The contract metaphor emphasized citizen participation, so long as it took place within institutionally sanctioned norms. Like appreciating the total picture and joining the “movement,” abiding by the social contract did not exclude dissent but it channeled it into manageable, institutional contexts.

Legacy of the Speech

Developing, implementing, and advocating for a full-scale war on poverty would be difficult in even the best of circumstances. The task was even more difficult at a time when the Vietnam War raged, civil rights efforts had stalled, and the patience of activists had begun to wane. As Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Sargent Shriver—aka “Mr. Poverty”—faced a challenging rhetorical situation. His speech to the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty illustrated some of those challenges, as Shriver tried to negotiate the tensions between traditional means of democratic engagement and the direct action favored by activists. Noel Cazenave’s history of the War on Poverty summarized how the poverty program’s emphasis on “maximum feasible participation” by the poor in community action programs actually may have sowed the seeds of the criticism Shriver faced at the Citizens Crusade conference:

Even though the Johnson administration did not condone the use of community action as a platform from which poor people of color could launch political challenges to mayors, the maximum feasible participation movement of the poor, with a boost from the civil rights movement and the citizens participation revolution, had obtained, for a while at least, momentum of its own beyond the control of the elites who had launched it.48

Shriver’s speech to the Citizens Crusade urged the activists to look at the “total picture” and to understand progress as part of a larger “movement” that eventually would prevail. Yet newspaper reports the day after Shriver’s speech described a chaotic scene at the International Inn, with some audience members urging delegates to listen to Shriver while others booed his remarks or refused to listen at all. When asked about the audience’s response, Shriver downplayed the hostile reception, telling reporters that he highly suspected the protest was orchestrated by a smaller number of agitators and planned long before he gave his remarks. Yet the reception may have inspired him to adjust and adapt his rhetorical strategies as the War on Poverty evolved.

By the middle of 1967, greater efforts were made to define community action in a way that would salvage the program and make acceptable the type of participation being encouraged and funded by the OEO. In a speech at Yale University almost exactly one year after the Crusade speech, Shriver would return to the theme of dissatisfaction in articulating an even more specific form of restrained citizenship. While he applauded dissent and honored great American dissenteres, Shriver turned to the needs of the current context, stating: “The problem is not—as many say—dissatisfaction. Rather, the question is how to use dissatisfaction creatively.” Shriver
then explained what it meant to express dissatisfaction creatively, returning to the theme that it was best to work within the system:

Despite all those who are committed to pot or the picket lines or throwing eggs at Hubert Humphrey—there are still countless young Americans who are using their dissatisfaction creatively. They are dissatisfied about the towns in Appalachia with no sewers. So they join VISTA and go down there to help build sewers. They are protesting the primitive way of life of the American Indians. So they go to the reservations and teach in Head Start classes. They are protesting the slums in East St. Louis. So they go there and work in a Neighborhood Youth Corps. This is the kind of dissatisfaction that only courage can create, and history can honor... Instead of telling everyone what's wrong with a world they didn't make, they are helping to do what's right in a world they can make.49

These speeches reflected a view of the “heroic citizen” common in American politics—one that deemphasizes confrontation and disruption in favor of volunteerism and working within the existing system of governmental social programs.50 In his speech to the Citizens Crusade, Shriver tried to negotiate a middle ground, acknowledging the value of criticism and dissent yet trying to channel those impulses into more manageable avenues for supporting governmental poverty programs. Walking the line between conflict and consensus, Shriver addressed enduring questions of citizenship and civic identity, offering his perspective on what it means to be a good citizen. How do you balance activism and unity, and when should you compromise? How does a citizen remain committed to exposing America’s faults, while appreciating its accomplishments and celebrating its ideals? When should one demand change now and when should one settle for gradual reform? Shriver’s speech grapples with those questions but it offers no definitive answers.

The aptly titled 2010 documentary on Shriver’s life, An American Idealist, well summarizes his influence on American public life. From the Peace Corps to the War on Poverty and the Special Olympics, Shriver was an idealist too often overshadowed by those he served. Yet Shriver was not a blind optimist or a naïve idealist, especially after the hardened battles that accompanied the War on Poverty. His idealism was tempered and realistic, and, more than many, he legitimately valued and fought for the messiness that always accompanies democratic action. Of course, he sometimes was caught in the middle, unable to please activists or presidents. He was both champion and victim of the tensions between citizen participation and representative democracy, tensions which have long been a hallmark of American democracy.

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Notes


6 While “America First” would later become associated with antisemitic elements, the Yale students that originally founded the group included Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart and future President Gerald Ford. A discredited speech by Charles Lindbergh on September 11, 1941, is widely associated with irreparably damaging the reputation of the group. The organization itself disbanded just months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the slogan would resurface in more contemporary isolationist campaigns of Patrick Buchanan and Donald Trump.


14 Zarefsky, *President Johnson’s War on Poverty*, 27.


22 Shriver, “National Committee for Community Development.”


27 Zarefsky, *President Johnson’s War on Poverty*, 357.

33 Stewart, Smith, and Denton, *Persuasion and Social Movements*, 386-387.
34 Zarefsky, “Rhetoric of Three Establishment Movements,” 358.
35 All passages from Shriver’s April 14, 1966, speech before the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty conference are cited with reference to paragraph numbers in the printed text that accompanies this essay on the VOD website.
38 Heyse, *Theodore Roosevelt*.
39 Heyse, *Theodore Roosevelt*.
50 For a more extended discussion of these same themes as illustrated in presidential State of the Union addresses, see Troy A. Murphy, “Romantic Democracy and the Rhetoric of Heroic Citizenship,” *Communication Quarterly* 51 (2003): 192-208.